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Abstract
In this paper we make a contribution to the proof and trust
layer of the Semantic Web layer cake by integrating two
well founded techniques, namely DAML-S (for describ-
ing Web services with machine-processable semantics) and
SPKI/SDSI (for specifying authorization based access con-
trol). Our approach builds on the idea of autonomous grant-
ing of access rights and decision making based on indepen-
dent trust structures. Our framework allows the speciﬁcation
of access control related and functionality related aspects in a
uniﬁed way that is manageable and efﬁcient. Therefore, our
approach is useful not only in typical Web service based ap-
plications (client-server architecture) but also in peer to peer
and agent based applications.
1 Introduction
WiththeadventoftheSemanticWeb(Berners-Lee,Hendler,
& Lassila 2001; Fensel et al. 2002; Patel-Schneider &
Fensel 2002), Web services have gained even more im-
portance (Ankolekar et al. 2002). Semantic Web tech-
niques, especially ontologies, allow to describe Web ser-
vices with more machine understandable semantics, thus
enabling new features like automatic composition, simula-
tion and discovery of Web services (Ankolekar et al. 2002;
Burstein et al. 2003). The vision of the Semantic Web is
to make the current Web more like an information system.
In such an information system Web services play the role of
operations available to the users. However, the use of Web
services is not restricted to access information, but also in
many otherareas, for exampleelectronicbusiness and enter-
prise application integration.
Because of the vast heterogeneity of the available infor-
mation, information providers and users, security becomes
extremely important. Security related aspects are mostly
classiﬁed in three categories, namely conﬁdentiality, in-
tegrity and availability (Bishop 2003; Samarati & Capitani
di Vimercati 2001; Denning 1982). Access control, which
means the users must fulﬁll certain conditionsin order to ac-
cess certain functionality plays an important role in all three
ﬁelds. For example, a student must show her library card
to borrow a book from the university library. In context of
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conﬁdentiality, it means that a student has access to the in-
formation relevant to only her own library account and thus
can not know which other students have borrowed which
books. In context of integrity, it means that a student may
not change or cause a change in information relevant to the
library account of another student. In context of availability,
access control helps to prevent denial of service attacks that
can take place if the access is uncontrolled.
Current access control is mostly based on authentication,
which requires central control (registration) and proof of
identity. This identity based authentication leads to certain
limitations regarding the spontaneity and privacy and hence
not always desired. Therefore, we propose authorization
based access control rather than authentication based access
control of Web services. Authorization based access control
also includes authentication, but here the authentication is
based on public keys and not on identities.
1.1 Authorization based Access Control
Currently, access control is based on identity based authen-
tication, which means that the users must be known to the
provider, for example via registration.
However, since the Semantic Web is an open, distributed,
decentralized, dynamic and interoperable environment, in
which Web services must be offerable and usable by any-
one spontaneouslyand dynamically and users do not always
wish to disclose their identities, we believe, that security
infrastructures that require registrations or any other cen-
tral controlling components are not suitable in the Semantic
Web. Therefore,we proposeauthorizationbasedaccesscon-
trol rather than authentication based access control of Web
services.
Credentials are digitally signed documents, which can be
transmitted by untrusted channels like the Web, see e.g.,
(Biskup & Karabulut 2002; Chaum 1985). Credentials as-
sert a binding between a principal and some property. A
principal represents a user and depending on the context
identiﬁed by her public or secret key. The meaning of a
stated property may be a granted capability for a service,
an identity or a non-identifying characteristic of a user like
e.g., a skill. For further related work refer to (Brands 2000;
Blaze et al. 1999; Samarati 2002). The credential-based
public key infrastructure SPKI/SDSI (Ellison et al. 1999a;
1999b) allows each principal to issue credentials. Unlikeotherpublickeyinfrastructures,SPKI/SDSI requiresnocen-
tral certiﬁcation authority. Thus, each Web service provider
can issue and trust credentials independent of other ser-
vice providers and may even deﬁne her own trust struc-
ture. A Web service provider, acting as a veriﬁer, can lo-
callyandautonomouslydecidewhetheraccessto herservice
should be granted or not. Access decisions are based on the
provider’sinterpretationof a user’s capabilities or character-
istics given by shown SPKI/SDSI certiﬁcates. Furthermore,
users can request Web services spontaneouslywithout regis-
teringthemselves with the individualWeb serviceproviders.
Therefore SPKI/SDSI credentials are more suitable than the
classical authentication based systems for specifying access
control policies in the Semantic Web .
1.2 Requirements of Access Control for Semantic
Web Services
Web services are meant to offer certain functionalities that
depend on the input parameters supplied by its users. Often
input parameters must fulﬁll certain conditions in order to
assure correct behaviour of a Web service. Access control
ensures that only eligible users get access to a Web service.
The access control policy of a Web service is speciﬁed by
the provider of the Web service description which is mostly
identical with the provider of the Web service. An end user
knowing some Web services may combine few of them in
some way to solve a certain task at hand. Prior to executing
such a combination or plan she must know whether she can
fulﬁll the access control policy of the plan. Hence we iden-
tify the followingrequirementsfor specifyingaccess control
for Semantic Web services:
R1 The frameworkmust allow an end user to check and prove
her eligibility for a Web service or a combination of Web
services.
Now consider a Web service that offers electricity con-
tracts and requires that the customer is at least 18 years of
age. This requirementcan be speciﬁedas access controlpol-
icy of the Web service rather easily. However, the access
control policies of most of the Web services are not so sim-
ple. For example, it is quite realistic that an electricity com-
pany offering such a Web service requires that the customer
is at least 18 years of age as well as lives in a particular ge-
ographical region. The access control policy becomes even
morecomplexwhen the access controlrequiresnot onlythat
a user must have certain properties but also that a user may
not have certain properties. For example, the customer may
not have any outstanding accounts with the electricity com-
pany. We identifyfurtherrequirementsfor specifyingaccess
control for Semantic Web services:
R2 The frameworkmust supportthe speciﬁcation of complex
access control requirements.
Now consider that the electricity selling Web service has
two input parameters, namely deliveryAddress and
noticePeriod. The ”functional” precondition for the
deliveryAddress is that it must be a valid address in
Germany and for noticePeriod is that it must be either
1 month or 3 months. Further, the Web service’s access con-
trol policy requires that contracts with one month notice pe-
riod and delivery address outside a particular geographical
regionare closedonlywith users whocanprovetheir Green-
peace membership. Hence, we see that the access control
requirements of a Web service may depend on the requested
functionality (controlled by the values of the input parame-
ters) and that the provided functionality may depend on the
access control conditions fulﬁlled by the requester. Thus we
identifythat access controland functionalaspects are not al-
ways independent of each other and consequently following
requirement:
R3 Theframeworkmustbeabletospecifytheinterplayofthe
access control and functionalaspects of the Web services.
Web services are typically distinguished in atomic and
composite Web services. As the terms suggest, an atomic
Web service is one that can not be further broken into parts,
whereas a composite Web service is one that is decompos-
able into atomic and composite Web services, which are of-
tenreferredtoas componentWeb services. Inadditionto the
setofcomponentWebservices,acompositeWebservicehas
a control ﬂow and a data ﬂow graph that contain informa-
tion about how the component Web services are connected
and how the data ﬂows from one component Web service to
another respectively.
Consider the following two Web services: (1) a Web ser-
vice w1 that offers Greenpeace membership and (2) our
previous electricity selling Web service w2 which requires
Greenpeace membership for contracts with one month no-
tice period for delivery addresses outside a particular geo-
graphicalregion. Now considera compositeWeb servicew3
that ﬁrst executes Web service w1 and then Web service w2,
that is, it closes a Greenpeace membership before closing
an electricity contract. Obviously, the access requirement
”Greenpeacemembership”of Web service w2 is fulﬁlled af-
ter the execution of Web service w1 and hence Greenpeace
membershipis notrequiredtoaccessthecompositeWebser-
vicew3 althoughitis requiredbyits componentWeb service
w2.
While the access control policy of an atomic Web service
can be speciﬁed directly, the access control policy of a com-
posite Web service depends on those of its component Web
services and thus must be computed by the provider of the
compositeweb service. Hence, we identifythe followingre-
quirements for specifying access control for Semantic Web
services:
R4 The framework must support a Web service provider in
computing the access control policy of a composite Web
service, whereby
R5 The framework must consider credentials that are issued
to the requester on the ﬂy, that is, during the execution of
a composite Web service.
1.3 Our Approach
In this paper, we present a Semantic Web compatible ap-
proach for specifying access control policies of Web ser-
vices to make Semantic Web services more useful whilekeeping the spirit of the Semantic Web. We combine two
well founded techniques, namely DAML-S (Ankolekar et
al. 2002) for describing Web services and SPKI/SDSI for
specifying access control policies. Our approach is one of
the few contributions in the proof and trust layer of the Se-
mantic Web layer cake (Patel-Schneider & Fensel 2002).
We view access control policies as conditions a Web ser-
vice provider deﬁnes to restrict the set of users who may
access the functionalities offered by her Web service. We
introducea policyalgebrato specifyandhandlecomplexac-
cess control policies more efﬁciently. We show how a Web
service provider can specify access control policies as pol-
icy algebraexpressionsin access controllist entries and how
access control lists can be integrated as preconditions in the
description of a Web service.
A user wishing to access a functionality offered by a Web
service must prove that she is eligible to gain access to the
required functionality. On the basis of the access control
policy of the Web service, the user calculates an appropriate
subsetofhercredentials. Shesends thissubset ofcredentials
to the Web service providerto proveher eligibility. TheWeb
service provider acting as a veriﬁer decides autonomously
on the basis of the shown credentials and her trust structure
whether access should be granted to the user or not. We
will show, how the transmission of credentials can be made
possible by augmentingthe set of input parameters of a Web
service by one parameter that carries the set of credentials
from a user to a Web service provider.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we give
short introductions to the well known Semantic Web ser-
vices description language, DAML-S and to the credential
based public key infrastructure SPKI/SDSI. We introduce a
policyalgebra and show how it can be used in access control
list entries to expressaccess controlpolicies moreefﬁciently
and dynamically. Then we present our main contribution
by showing how SPKI/SDSI credentials can be integrated
with DAML-S to specify access control policies and how
users can interpret access control policies speciﬁed in a Web
service description and act accordingly. In section 3, we
present an application scenario and show by example how
our framework can be used. Finally, we conclude in sec-
tion 4.
1.4 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, (Denker et al. 2003) is
the only work that has dealt with the issue of security and
DAML-S in detail. Our work is complementary to the men-
tioned contribution. (Denker et al. 2003) focus on develop-
ing security-related ontologies and two step matchmaking.
Our focus is on a Semantic Web compliant security infras-
tructure and framework. We believe, that it is not always
possible to handle security-related and functionality related
characteristicsseparatelybecauseofthecompositionalityis-
sues and anticipate a uniﬁed framework that can represent
both types of properties. (Kagal, Finin, & Joshi 2003) intro-
duce a policy language for marking up Semantic Web enti-
ties. However, it is not yet clear, how this policy language
can be integrated and used with a Web service description
language e.g., DAML-S.
2 Speciﬁcation of Access Control Policies of
Semantic Web Services
In our approach, we combine two well founded techniques,
namely DAML-S (Ankolekar et al. 2002) for describing se-
mantic Web services and SPKI/SDSI for specifying access
control policies. In this section, we ﬁrst give short introduc-
tion to DAML-S, SPKI/SDSI and policy algebra and then
show how SPKI/SDSI can be integrated with DAML-S to
enable access control with semantic Web services.
2.1 Introduction to DAML-S
DAML-Sis a DAML+OIL ontologyfordescribingWeb ser-
vices with the objective of making Web services computer-
interpretable and hence enabling tasks like discovery, com-
position, simulation, interoperation and execution moni-
toring of Web services. DAML-S complements the vari-
ous industrial efforts that are low-level, by providing Web
service descriptions at application level (Ankolekar et
al. 2002; Burstein et al. 2003). DAML-S has three
main parts, namely ServiceProfile, ServiceModel
and ServiceGrounding. ServiceProfile con-
tains properties related to the functionality a service of-
fers and answers the question what does a service do?,
ServiceModel contains properties related to the opera-
tion of a Web service and answers the question How does a
service work? and ServiceGrounding contains proper-
ties related to the access to a Web service and answers the
question How can a service be accessed?
A service proﬁle provides a high-level description of a
service andits provider. It is used to request or advertiseser-
vices with discovery services and capability registries. Ser-
vice proﬁlesconsist of threetypes of information: a descrip-
tion of the service and the service provider; the functional
behavior of the service and several functional attributes tai-
lored for automated service selection.
The operation of a Web service is described in terms of
a process model, which details both the control structure
and data ﬂow structure of the service. Two main compo-
nents of the process model are the process ontology, which
describes a service in terms of its inputs, output, precon-
ditions, effects and where appropriate, its component sub-
processes; and the process control ontology which describes
each process in terms of its state, including initial activa-
tion, execution and completion. The primary kind of entity
in the process ontology is process. DAML-S distinguishes
between atomic, simple and composite processes. Atomic
processes are directly invocable and execute in a single step.
Simple processes, on the other hand, are not directly invoca-
ble and are not associated with a grounded. They are rather
used as elements of abstraction. Composite processes are
decomposableinto other (non-compositeor composite) pro-
cesses. Their decompositions are speciﬁed by control con-
structs such as sequence, if-then-else, repeat-while etc..
A grounding can be thought of as a mapping from an ab-
stract to concrete speciﬁcation of those service description
elements that are requiredfor interactingwith a service. The
grounding of a service has mainly to do with the protocoland message formats, serialization, transport and address-
ing.
In DAML-S, both ServiceProfile and
ServiceModel are conceived as abstract represen-
tations whereas ServiceGrounding deals with the
concrete level of speciﬁcation. For more informa-
tion on DAML-S, refer to (Ankolekar et al. 2002;
Burstein et al. 2003).
2.2 Introduction to SPKI/SDSI
SPKI/SDSIis acredentialbasedpublickeyinfrastructurere-
sultedbymergingSDSI (SimpleDistributedSecurityInfras-
tructure) and SPKI (Simple Public Key Infrastructure). The
SDSI part of SPKI/SDSI proposes the use of local names,
the SPKI part deals with authorization and delegation of au-
thorization. We consider SPKI/SDSI for credential based
access control as proposed in (Ellison et al. 1999a; 1999b;
Rivest & Lampson 1996).
ThemainadvantageofSPKI/SDSI comparedtoothercre-
dential based systems is that it does not require central con-
trol and allows users, e.g., Web service providers to specify
their own trust structures independent of each other. Each
participant acting as certiﬁcation authority (CA) can issue
certiﬁcates to other users and acting as user can prove her
eligibility by showing an appropriate set of credentials to
the service provider. A Web service provideracting as a ver-
iﬁer checks the shown set of credentials against the access
controlpolicyof the Web service andgrantsor deniesaccess
accordingly.
SPKI/SDSI supports two kinds of credentials, namely
name certiﬁcates to bind principals to names and authoriza-
tion certiﬁcates to bind authorizations to names. Besides
name certiﬁcates and authorization certiﬁcates, SPKI/SDSI
also provides access control lists (ACL) for specifying ac-
cess control policies for some interface.
Name Certiﬁcates An SPKI/SDSI name certiﬁcate is
used to bind principals to a name and is a document of the
form
<Keyholder,Name,Subject,Validity>
1 Keyholder represents the issuing principal who certiﬁes
the body with a signature.
2 Name is an identiﬁer chosen by the issuing principal Key-
holder to form a local name. In SPKI/SDSI every princi-
palis associatedwithherlocalnamespacewhichistheset
of her local names. A local name belonging to the name
space of the principal Keyholder has the syntactical form
Keyholder Name and is evaluated to a set of principals.
3 Subject inserts a principal, a local name or an extended
name into the set of principals denoted by the local name
Keyholder Name. Similar to local names, Subject is eval-
uated to a set of principals.
4 Validity denotes the validity of the certiﬁcate.
Consider for example a magazine company EcoMag that
issues membership cards to its subscribers. A member-
ship card for a subscriber Alice is modeled by the following
SPKI/SDSI name certiﬁcate:
<KEcoMag,subscriber,KAlice,till 2004 12 31>.
In this certiﬁcate, KEcoMag denotes the public key of the
magazine company EcoMag and KAlice denotes the pub-
lic key of the subscriber Alice. By issuing this name certiﬁ-
cate, the magazine company EcoMag certiﬁes, that KAlice
belongs to the local name KEcoMag subscriber, that is,
KAlice belongsto thegroup(set) of subscribersofKEcoMag.
As stated in the validity ﬁeld, this credential is valid until
31th December 2004.
Authorization Certiﬁcates An SPKI/SDSI authorization
certiﬁcate is used to bind an authorization to a name and is
a document of the form
<Keyholder,Subject,Authorization,Delegation,Validity>
that is signed by the keyholder.
1 Keyholder represents the issuing principal who certiﬁes
the body with the signature.
2 Subject denotes the set of grantees of the authorization,
e.g., a principal or a local name.
3 Authorization speciﬁes the granted permissions.
4 Delegation is a boolean ﬂag, which, if set, means that the
grantee is allowed to forward the permissions speciﬁed in
Authorization to other principals.
5 Validity denotes the validity of the certiﬁcate.
Consider again the magazine company EcoMag.
It grants full text access to the electronic edi-
tion of the magazine to its subscriber Alice by
issuing the following authorization certiﬁcate:
<KEcoMag,KAlice,fulltextaccess,false,till
2004 12 31>.
Access Control Lists and Access Decision SPKI/SDSI
provides access control lists (ACL) for specifying access
control policies for some interface. An ACL is a list of ACL
entries which are documents of the form
<Self,Subject,Authorization,Delegation,Validity>.
An ACL entry is equivalent to an authorization certiﬁcate
except that it is not signed, the Keyholder is the reserved
word Self instead of a key and it is not actually issued to
a principal (i.e., it remains locally stored at the provider’s
site). Both authorization certiﬁcates and ACL entries can
actually explicitly bind authorizations to principals, but, we
focus on bindings between authorizationsand names. Using
sucha bindingis more efﬁcientfor specifyingaccess control
conditions since names denote sets of principals instead of
single principals.
Consider again the previously mentioned magazine com-
pany EcoMag which grants full text access to the electronic
edition of the magazine to all its subscribers. To specify
this access control policy, it deﬁnes an ACL containing the
following ACL entry:
<Self,KEcoMagsubscriber,fulltextaccess,.,.>.
To access an interface, a requester must prove her eligi-
bility, that is, she must prove that her set of credentials ful-
ﬁlls the access control policy of the interface. To do so, sheconstructs an authorizing set (chain) of certiﬁcates from the
ACL and her set of certiﬁcates.
(Clarke et al. 2001) suggest a certiﬁcate chain discovery
algorithm that constructs such a chain of certiﬁcates from a
given set of certiﬁcates and an ACL. The algorithm inter-
prets an ACL entry as an unsigned authorization certiﬁcate
with Self as keyholder. It reduces chains of delegations
and local name meanings in the set of credentials by com-
puting the name reduction closure, by removing useless cre-
dentials (e.g., those that are not valid) and by constructing
a graph from the remaining credentials. In this graph, each
credential corresponds to a single directed edge that points
fromthecertiﬁcate’sissuertoits subject. Thealgorithmuses
depth-ﬁrst search to determine whether there is a path from
Self to the requesting principal. In case of success, the
principal sends the credentials lying on the determined path
to the provider of the interface. The provider, acting as veri-
ﬁer, takes an access decision based on the transmitted set of
credentials by constructing an unsigned authorization cer-
tiﬁcate of the form <Self,KA,Authorization,.,.>.
2.3 Using Policy Algebra in Access Control List
Entries
Web service providers specify access control policies of
their Web services by deﬁning ACLs. In section 1.2 we have
identiﬁed that the framework must support the speciﬁcation
of complex access control requirements (R2) as well as a
Web service provider in computing the access control pol-
icy of a composite Web service (R4). Thus the Web ser-
vice provider needs a mechanism that allows to specify not
onlysimplesubjects(e.g.,principalsorlocalnames)butalso
composed subjects.
For this reason, we use an extensionof the Subject ﬁeld of
an ACL entry as introduced in (Biskup & Wortmann 2003).
The extension allows the use of algebraic expressions built
from principals and local names and the operators addition
(+), conjunction (&) and subtraction ( ). It is based on
the set-theoretic semantics for SDSI given by (Clarke et al.
2001), in which every local name is evaluated to a set of
principals. The algebraic operators of the aforementioned
extension are interpreted as set-theoretic operations applied
to sets of principals. Although the semantics of the addition
and conjunction operators can be implemented in standard
SPKI/SDSI(Clarke et al. 2001), we claim that using the pol-
icyalgebraexpressionsis particularlysuitableforspecifying
and computing with complex access control policies.
The magazine company EcoMag allows its subscribers
who have a Visa or Diners credit card to buy a special re-
lease of the magazine. To do so, EcoMag deﬁnes an ACL
consisting of the following ACL entry:
<Self,subject,buyspecialrelease,.,.>,with
subject = KEcoMag subscriber
& (Kvisa card + Kdiner’s card)
Note, that the subject is an algebraic expression containing
the operators addition and conjunction.
2.4 Integration of DAML-S and SPKI/SDSI
In our approach, Web service providers specify the access
control policies of their Web services by using ACLs. In
this section we show how ACLs and SPKI/SDSI certiﬁcates
can be integrated with DAML-S.
Modeling Access Control Lists An ACL is a list of ACL
entries. Each ACL entry has the properties keyholder,
subject, authorization, delegation and
validity. Refer to class ACLEntry in ﬁgure 1 and to
its speciﬁcation in OWL in ﬁgure 2.
Access Control Policy as Precondition The access con-
trol policy of a Web service is a condition that a user
must fulﬁll in order to gain access to the Web service.
Further, as identiﬁed in section 1.2, access control and
functional aspects of a Web service are not always sep-
arable (R3). That is why we model the access control
policy of a Web service as a precondition. In DAML-
S, a Web service may have many preconditions, each of
which is a sub-property of the property precondition
of a process. The property precondition has range
Condition, which is currently a place-holder. To model
access control policy as precondition, we introduce a class
AccessControlCondition as subclass of the class
Condition of DAML-S process model. Other pre-
conditions can be knowledge preconditions or those im-
posed on functionality related input parameters (Burstein
et al. 2003; Ankolekar et al. 2002). The class
AccessControlCondition has two important proper-
ties, (i) L, an access control list and (ii) I, that refers to
the name of the input parameter that is used to carry cre-
dentials from a user to a Web service provider. The pair
(L;I) is interpreted as: the credentials in I fulﬁll the condi-
tion speciﬁed in the Subject ﬁelds of the ACL entries of L.
Referto class AccessControlConditionand its prop-
erties accessControlList and inputParameter in
ﬁgure 1. By modeling AccessControlCondition as
subclass of class Conditionof DAML-S process, we pro-
vide a Web service provider a mechanism to specify access
control policies in a similar manner as the preconditions re-
lated to the functional parameters.
Set of Credentials as Input A user possesses a set of
SPKI/SDSI certiﬁcates. Using the ACL given in the precon-
ditions of a Web service, she calculates a set of certiﬁcates
with the help of the chain discovery algorithm as described
earlier in section 2.2. A user must send the calculated set
(chain) of certiﬁcates to a Web service provider in order to
prove her eligibility. Note, that unlike the number of func-
tionality related input parameters, the number of certiﬁcates
a user may send may vary from user to user. Therefore, a
Web service providercan not know at the time of describing
a Web service, how many certiﬁcates a user will send.
Therefore, we model a class SetOfCertificates
with a property certificate of multiple cardi-
nality and having the range SPKICertificate
to carry a set of SPKI/SDSI certiﬁcates. Fur-
ther, we specify classes SPKINameCertificate
and SPKIAuthorizationCertificateFigure 1: Integration of DAML-S and SPKI
as subclasses of SPKICertificate. Re-
fer to classes SetOfCertificates,
SPKICertificate, SPKINameCertificate
and SPKIAuthorizationCertificate in ﬁg-
ure 1. A Web service provider will use the class
SetOfSPKICertificates to specify the input
parameter that will be used by the user to send any SPKI
certiﬁcates.
Output A Web service can return new credentials in ad-
dition to the functionality related outputs. To specify such
output parameters, a Web service provider can use class
SPKICertificate. Refer to ﬁgure 1. The credentials
that are delivered by a component Web service can be used
by other component Web services in the same process.
3 Application Scenario
In this section we describe a typical use case of access con-
trol of Web services and show how it can be realized with
our approach.
3.1 Scenario Description
The magazine company EcoMag offers full text access to
the electronic edition of the magazine to its subscribers and
to customers of a green electricity company. We will show
later how we specify this access control policy as an ACL.
The magazine company recognizes its subscribers by a
particular membership card issued by the company itself.
We model such a membership card as an SPKI/SDSI name
certiﬁcate.
However, recognizing customers of a green electricity
company is not so straight forward assuming that nowadays
and in future not only big energy companies but practically
everybody can generate and feed electricity into the elec-
tricity network. This means that practically everybody can
act as a small electricity company spontaneously and dy-
namically. The problem for the magazine is, how to decide
whether a particular electricity company,say ElecComp, ac-
tually sells green electricity or not. To solve this problem,
the magazine trusts a number of organizations, e.g., Ener-
gyVision and GreenPower, that directly or indirectly issue
eco-labels to companies that sell green electricity.
In our application scenario, we model the eco-labels as
well as the contract between the electricity company and the
customer as SPKI/SDSI name certiﬁcates.
If a user, say Alice, wants to gain full text access to the
magazine’selectroniceditionshe has two options: eithershe
shows her membership card to the web service provider or
she needs to prove, that she is a customer of an electric-
ity company, e.g. ElecComp, that possesses an eco-label,
say either ok-power or gold, issued by one of the organiza-
tionstrustedbythe magazinecompany. In ordertoproveher
eligibility, Alice shows an appropriate chain of SPKI/SDSI
certiﬁcates. She calculates the required chain from the Web
service’s ACL and her set of SPKI/SDSI certiﬁcates. She
can use the chain discovery algorithm described in section<owl:Class rdf:ID="ACLEntry"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&owl;#Thing"/>
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="keyholder">
<owl:domain rdf:resource="#ACLEntry"/>
<owl:range rdf:resource="&xsd;#string"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="subject">
<owl:domain rdf:resource="#ACLEntry"/>
<owl:range rdf:resource="&xsd;#string"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="authorization">
<owl:domain rdf:resource="#ACLEntry"/>
<owl:range rdf:resource="&xsd;#string"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="delegation">
<owl:domain rdf:resource="#ACLEntry"/>
<owl:range rdf:resource="&xsd;#string"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="validity">
<owl:domain rdf:resource="#ACLEntry"/>
<owl:range rdf:resource="&xsd;#string""/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
</owl:Class>
Figure 2: OWL ontology of Access Control List Entry
2.2for the calculationby interpretingthe web service’s ACL
entries as SPKI/SDSI authorization certiﬁcates.
3.2 Realization in our Approach
The magazine company EcoMag speciﬁes its access control
policy by an ACL containing the ACL-entry given in ﬁgure
3, which is equivalent to the following tuple in the typical
SPKI/SDSI notation:
<Self,subject,fulltextaccess,false,now>,with
subject = KEnergyVision ok-power customer
+ KGreenPower gold customer
+ Self subscriber
IfAliceisasubscriberofthemagazineEcoMag,shecould
gain full text access by showing her membership card that is
speciﬁed by the SPKI/SDSI name certiﬁcate
<KEcoMag,subscriber,KAlice,till 2004 12 31>.
If she is a customer of the electricity company ElecComp
that has received the eco label ’ok-power’, she could also
gain full text access by showing the following chain (set) of
SPKI/SDSI name certiﬁcates:
f <KEnergyVision,ok-power,KElecComp,.> ,
<KElecComp,customer,KAlice,.> g
4 Conclusion
We have shown an approach for specifying and using access
control with Semantic Web services. Our approach allows
<rdf:RDF . . .>
<acp:AccessControlEntry rdf:ID="ace1">
<acp:keyholder>Self</acp:keyholder>
<acp:subject>
K(EnergyVision) ok-power customer
+ K(GreenPower) gold customer
+ Self subscriber
</acp:subject>
<acp:authorization>fulltextaccess</acp:authorization>
<acp:delegation>false</acp:delegation>
<acp:validity>now</acp:validity>
</acp:AccessControlEntry>
</rdf:RDF>
Figure 3: Access control list entry speciﬁed in OWL for the
full text access web service provided by the magazine com-
pany EcoMag.
the speciﬁcation of access control related and functionality
related aspects in one uniﬁed framework. We classify our
work as one of the few contributions that ﬁt in the proof and
trust layer of the Semantic Web layer cake. We motivated
that authorization based access control is better suited for
the Semantic Web than authentication based access control.
We identiﬁed the requirements for an access control frame-
work for Semantic Web Services. We showed how creden-
tials can be used in the Semantic Web and how SPKI/SDSI
can be used to specify credentials. We introduced policy al-
gebra as a mean to specify and handle complex access con-
trol policies more efﬁciently. We showed how SPKI/SDSI
credentials be modeled and integrated with DAML-S. We
gave an application scenario and demonstrated how our ap-
proach works within a concrete setting.
Although our approach is technically mature enough to
be used in scenarios with simple Web services, there are still
some issues that need to be investigatedin more detail to en-
able more complex applications. For example, in case of a
composite Web services, there must be some (semi-) auto-
matic mechanism to calculate the access control policy of a
compositeWebservicefromits controlﬂowgraph,dataﬂow
graph and the access control policies of its component Web
services. We see the problem of dealing with credentials
that are delivered as output or consumed by a component
Web service of a composite Web service as another impor-
tant problem that should be investigated in the future.
We did not deal with discovery of Web services in this
paper but believe that existing approaches can still be used
when slightly modiﬁed for example as follows. A discovery
algorithm can assume all access control related conditions
to be true and calculate a set of Web services that offer the
required functionality. The discovering component can then
send the preconditions of the relevant Web services to the
user, who can check the satisﬁability of the preconditionson
the basis of her set of credentials.
Our long-term goal is to investigate the compositionality
of semantic Web services and access control policies. We
believe, that speciﬁcation of access control policies and Se-
manticWeb servicesinoneuniﬁedframeworkis a necessary
requirement for further research in the aforementionedarea.Acknowledgements
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